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Some New Ethanol Technology: Cost Competition and Adoption Effects
in the Petroleum Market
Abstract
Growing dependence on imported oil has been a source of concern in the United States, despite potential
consumer benefits from low cost imports. Much attention has focused on exposure to the instability of the
world petroleum markets. Disadvantages that are associated with an embargo include incomplete adjustment
with asset-fixity and unemployment (Tolly and Wilman, Broadman and Bruce). Offsetting use of policy
instruments, such as import tax increases that reduce demand while acquiring strategic petroleum reserve
(SPR), are effective at improving consumer welfare when embargo uncertainty is present (Teisburg, T.J.).
Similarly, Yucell demonstrated the effectiveness of a combined gasoline tax and SPR. Others have examined
the possibility that welfare would be higher with the optimum tariff in place (Bizer and Stuart).
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Abstract
Somenewethanol technology, whichincreases processing yieldsfromcellulose material, can compete with
petroleum products on a cost basis. Technology adoption would afFcctpetroleum prices even when the raw
material supply is limited to Midwesterncom residues. The welfare benefits of technology adoptionextend
beyond conventional producer and consumer gains. The benefits include a value for mitigating the effects of
monopoly pricing on the world petroleum market and an option value for reducing the adverse consequences
of an oil embargo.
1Growing dqiendence on imported oU has been a source of concern in the United States, despite potential
o^isumer benefits fixmi lowcost in^rts. Much attentionhas focused on exposure to the instabilityof theworld
petroleummarkets. Disadvantages that areassociatedwith anembargo include incomplete adjustment withasset-
fixity andunen^lqyment (Tolfy andWihnan, Broadman andBruce). Ofisetting useof policy instruments, such
as import taxincreases that reduce demandwhile acquiring strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), are effective at
m^jroving consumerwelfare \^hen embargo uncertainty ispresent (Teisburg, T.J). Similarly, Yucell demonstrated
the eSectiveBess ofacranbm^gasoline taxand SPR, Others have examined the possibility that welfare would
be higherwith the optimum tariff in place (BizerandStuart).
Substitute fiiels are ofleii regarded ashigh cost alternatives toiiBports Forinstance, new coal and nuclei
power costs ^fine aniq)per limit inpetroleum pricing decisions (OPEC Bulletin). Fuels made fi'om agricultural
materials arealso regarded ashigh cost, due to processing costs anda limited amount of land suitable forcom
production 04eddK)^ Tyner andHolland). Further, ethanol will not becompetitive inthe fiiel m^ket using com-
processing technology in the mtermediate ran (Kane, etal). Nonetheless, fuels and chemical products made fi'om
agricultural materials may deserve another look because there is some new technology for converting cellulose
into ethanol.
This stucfy reviews the prospects for a new fuel technology and wcamines the price and wdfare
implications for the North American petroleummarket. One distinginshmg feature of this stucfy* is analvsis of
the effect ofnew technology in an importing country that faces limited market power iri,trade. Also, given the
history of theNorth American petroleum trade, measurement of the new technology's option value for reducing
the ad\'erse effects ofan embargo is mqjortant for the welfare analysis. Aconceptual analvsis ofthe market and
welfare effects ofnewtechnologv- are discussed in the next two sections. Afterwards, afavorable e\-aluation for
the competitiveness and supply potential ofanew ethanol technology is presented.
Next, smiulations suggest that new supplies will reduce petroleum prices moderately and increase consumers"
welfare. Further, there are gains to the owners ofnew resources associated with fuel production, and the option
2value of the new technology for reducing an embargo's disruption is important Overall, there is anet gain for
the U.S. when these benefits are wiighed against the losses of estabUshed domestic petroleum producers. The
net gains for the United States offset the losses ofimporting countries.
Price Formation, Embargoes and New Technology
Mabro recently suggested that oligopoly pricing occurs in the world petroleum markets. OPEC usually
has some price-setting ability but fuU monopoly exploitation is limited bymarket-share requirements ofsome
mdividual members and unpredictable supplies from the competitive fringe. The supplies of the competitive
fringe are definedmainly lyprocessing capacity in the short run but respond to price increases in the intermediate
run, as exploration leads to new reserves. As afirst approximation, the limited supply that is prominent in
resource models is offset by reserve discovery, time discounting and avery distant friture.
Consider the U.S. petroleum trade with oligopoly pricing. In Figure 1. the U.S. demand is represented
by D.mpanel b. Siqjply is given as the sum ofexcess siqjpBes from the fringe, ESj, (mainly Canada and Mexico)
and domestic U.S. suppKes, S.. The residual demand for OPEC oil is given by the difference between HfmpnH
and the sum ofdomestic and fringe supplies. This excess demand is given by ED in panel a. The OPEC cartel
follows apricing strategy that balances perceived marginal revenues from additional supplies (Mig and
production costs (CJ, which defines the equihbrium price ? in panel a. Notice that the oligopoly price is
somewhat higher than the price that would prevail in acompetitive market, which is C„.
AIwothetical embaigo is also shown in Figure 1. SpecificaUy, the north American maricet clears at its
autarky price, P., in the event that imports from OPEC are prohibited. Then the net welfare loss for North
America is gi.-en by the mangle's area E, «hich is below the excess demand curve and above the initial price line.
This is the American welfare loss in the event that no imports are available. Ironically, the north American
welfare loss under an embargo is also the welfare gain in the event of free trade.
OPEC profits also decline in the event of on embargo, by the size ofinitial profits from north .^merican
sales (area Hin panel a). The profit loss suggests that the embargo would not be undertaken for apurely '
economic reason.
Now consider the prospect ofa technology change that increases the supply ofpetroleum or asimilar
material that can be used in the production ofproducts like gasoline and chemicals. In figure 2, the supply
schedule shifts rightward by the amount St. In turn, the excess demand, marginal revenue and oil price are all
reduced, preserving the balance between perceived marginal costs and marginal revenues in panel a. Imports
and prices both decline with the supply increase, from to Ij, and from to Pj.
The price change redistributes benefits within the north American market. First, the price reduction
provides abenefit to U.S. consumes ofarea A+B+C+D in panel b. Owners ofdomestic oil lose the area Bwith
lower prices. So there is adomestic gam of consumers over established producers ofA+D+C. Further, the
owners ofthe newsq)pfyreceive abenefitwith revenues defined by area F+G. Consequently, there will be anet
domestic gain, as long as revenues on the new supply exceed the corresponding production costs. Specifically
the domestic gain isgiven by
AW=A+D+C+F+G
The combination of areas, AW, represents the net gain of consumers and new supply owners over the losses
ofestablishedproducers in the trade state.
Also, the potential welfare loss in America due to an embargo probably declines with technology
adoption. One COTiponcntofthe loss reduction is the area between the initial and final ED curves and above the
pre-change pnce line, AEj . But there is also atrade-state benefit, A.E , associated with the reduction in
petroleum price; the area behind the post-change excess demand curve, ED^, and between the price lines, Po and
Pi ,must be subtracted because the trade-state gain is forgone in the event of an embargo. Hence, the net
reduction in embargo-related losses is AE= AE. -AE. There is aconditional gain in the event of trade
interruption, unless AE, gets large with large trade-state price reductions.. Ironically, this gain occurs because
the domestic supply shift reduces America's trade surplus.
The sxpected value is uscfii] in accounting for tlie stochastic nann-e of the embargo loss. Given the
4conditional loss reduction, AE, and a probability of trade interruption, p, the expected value of the loss is the
product.
O = p • AE
Theexpected loss, O, is the option valueof the technology investment; it is the amountthe countryis willing to
pay for the option to reduce thewelfare loss in theevent of an embargo. In the event that embargos p^ally
restrict imports, a firaction, f, that reflects the actual reduction of imports couldbe used as a multiplier for an
adjusted estimate of the option value.
The overall e?q)e<^welfare gain forAmerica is the weighted average ofwelfare in the trade-state and
the embargo-state:
EiW) == p AE+{l~p) AW
Inthe nomial market state, the technology ransfers benefits toconsimiers and owners ofthe new siqjply and away
from established domestic producers for anet domestic welfare gain. The net domestic welfare gain isthe result
ofreduced OPEC profits and partially reduced deadweight welfare losses. Inthe embargo sate, similar benefit
transfers occur for the reduction intrade surplus loss. However, magnitudes are magnified because adjustments
in OPEC suppliesareexcluded.
Both the Price effects and Benefit changes differ from die outcome that would occur in acompetitive
market without the possibility ofan embargo. Under competition with trade certaint\-, the price would be C,,
before and after the price change. Hence domestic consumers and petroleum producers would not experience a
benefit from the technology. But owners ofthe new supply would receive benefits that are defined by the cost
of producing petroleum. In the presence of oligopoly pricing then, the producer returns to the technology
in\ estment are larger (areas F-Kj), defined by the oligopoly price ofoil. Further, there is aconsumer benefit
which exceeds the loss to established domestic petroleum producers.
5Model of an OligopolyMarket
An algebraicstatementofmaiket relationships is convenient for measuring the effects of new technology
when there is market power in the import market.
Market poweris often measured by a coefficient that can represent the inverse of the number ofequal-
sized producers sharing the market (Breshnahan). For example,consider a price-dependentdemandftmction,
P(Q),\^ch givesthetotalrevenueTR=P(Q)*Q, whereP representsprice and Q represents quantity. Suppose
theperceivedmarginal revenue isMR=P+A.Q 8P/oQ, dP/dQ beingtheslopeof the price-dependentdemandcurve
and Xis themaricet powercoefficient. Noticethat perceived marginal revenue approaches themarketdemand
price as the numberof firmsgets large andXapproaches zero. At the other extreme, the perceived marginal
revenue approaches that of the pure monopolistwhenXapproaches unity, hi econometric studies, estimatesof
the maricet power coefficient indicate the extent to which processors have exploited market power when the
producer's costs are unknown. Li this study,however, values of Xare chosento indicate the extentofmarket
power implied byknown production costs and actual pricing beha\ior in a reference period.
Anm^rt allocation rule thatis based onOPEC pricing under limited market power can bedeveloped inthe
case where the import demand ftmction for OPEC oil is linear. The import response function depends on
domestic siq)plies, income and OPEC production costs. To see this, suppose that the supply (QJand fitrmand (Q^)
for petroleum are
where P^, represents the oil price, and Yis the GDP or national income in the U.S. and Q is the supplv change
associated with the new production techmque Also, domestic and fringe output is included in the supply
variables. Both functions represent intermediate run adjustments of, sa\-, a5to 10 year period.
6The import demand function is the differencebetweensupply and demand
where Qj represents imports. So the price dependent fonn of the import demand fimction is
c. dp 1
p =-J.—f—^—i + —Y. So —
° b+b^ b+b. dQ. b+b.
s a s a s a
The cartel's import allocation rulesatisfies dierequirement thatperceivedmarginal revenue equals marginal
cost: MR,=Co. In turn, the perceived marginal revenue function is developed from the price-dependent in^jort
fimction, yielding
. ® b+b b+b. b +b.
s a s d s a
Further, the marginal costofSaudi oilis given. It is defined byCg. Upon rearranging^ the import allocation rule
that balances revenues and cost is
-o c. b+JD, •
Q. =— t E+ g? y_ -s dp
1+A 1+A 1+A °
Structure and maricet conditions affect miports, according to the import response fimction. Imports vary
inversely with the extent ofmarket power, i.e. Qj decreases with increases in X. Moreover, changing market
conditions affect imports; increases in alternative supplies, increasing OPEC costs and falling income all reduce
the import allocation to theAmericanmarket.
Themarket relationships can be included in asj'stem ofequations for comprehensive determination oftrade
and prices. In addition to the supply, demand and OPEC response fimction discussed above, the determinants
ofproduction costs and an equilibrium condition are also included. The adjustments to aprice change described
by this static model include the intermediate run adjusmients of investment in new resen-es and in suppiy;
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demand adjustments extend b^ond the period ofasset fixity. The equations ofthe simulation model are shown
below
l.C =a +C^t
o o o o o
2.Q,=a^-a^-e,+c^y- cy (l+X)
3.Q^=a^-b^^^*cJ
i.Q^=a^*h^P^
5.C^=Q,+Q,+Q,]
endogenous: Q^r Q^r Q^r
where represents Saudi Reserves and the trend, t, defines the annual change in reserves. A static model is
suitablefor the analysis of a technology change because the equilibrium eiSects of a sustainedsupplyshift are
measured.
New EthanolTechnology: Competitiveness and Supply
Presently, ethanol occupies a niche in the fuel market It is blended at a 1:10proportionwithgasolene
to provide owgenated fuels requiredby EPA rules in urban areaswith somogproblems. Ethanol use as a
complete fiile islimited due tohigh production costs. However, emerging woo(fy biomass conversion technology
improves tha odds that access to the commodity fuel andchemical marketswill occur.
The dominant commercial technology' for ethanol production depol\"merizes the starch in com grain to
the six carbon sugar glucose. Glucose isthen fermented to ethanol(Johnson, p.76 and 117), most commonly by
Saccharamyces cerevisea. Organisms and engines for these commercial conversions are readily available.
An alternative technology uses wood orwood-like materials (called ''woody biomas")and converts
cellulose to glucose. The intermediate conversion ofthe cellulose component to glucose sugar is accomplished
with some readily available acids orenzymes whereupon the technology for conversion to ethanol is similar to
that used in com processing. Ho\ve\'er, available raw materials, such as woodv biomass chips or crop residues,
contain considerable henu-cellulose polymers of five carbon sugars whose monomers are not readily converted
toethanol byaamrally occurring organisms.
8But a new technology advance elevates the potential for yield increases. Specifically, geneticallyengineered
b^:teriaareenable of converting the hemi-cellulose derived pentoseandglucose sugars into ethanolwithhigh
yields (Zhang, et al). Further, thesenewbacteria will convertmixedglucose and pentose sugars in the same rate.
Thus,themixedsugars fixjm cellulose andhemi-cellulose components are processed in the same process train,
.viiich reduces equipment costs. Hence the problemoflowyields and separate fermentation processes associated
with cellulosic material, are largely overcome.
Thepotential yield increase is largebecause it essentially doubles the ethanol available in theprocessing of
woo^ biomass andcrop materials intoethanol. Prior to thepossibility ofr^id pentose conversion, yields on
tfie orda* of.191b edianol/lb wood chips were possible. Now, yields onthe order of .42 lbethanol/Ibofdry mattw
biomass are realistic ifnew technology meets expectations(NationaI Academy ofSciences).
The chemical process is just entering the demonstration phase; eadi component reaction has been
verified atsome scale ofoperation.. However, anintegrated test plant has not operated for an extended period.
Thus, expectations \^t11 be confirmed in about five years unless unforseen technical difficulties or high
e?q)cnditures on plant operation occur(U.S. Dept. ofEnergy); Specifically, arecent cost stu(fy that isbased on
best case expected yields, projected capital and equipment needs and currentmarket conditions. The projections
suggest that ethanol could have aprice comparable to the wholesale gasoline price by processing from wood-
ch^s in alarge plant Recent competition for woodchips from the paper industry for fiber usage hag escalated,
whichmay alter these economics.
Accordmgly, Midwestern com stover, techmcally smtable as afeedstock iii the new ethanol process, deserves
consideration as acommercial rawmaterial. Indeed, stalks may be alow-valued input that is well suited to the
Midwest, as it is not necessary to recover land costs that have alrca<^ been taken into account in com profit
calculations and output decisions.
Prssenti^. the economic value ofcom stover arises from t^vo sources. First, erosion levels and fertiiizcr
requirements are bodi reduced when com sto\ er is left on the ground. Second com 3tc\ er provide alow-grade
*com stover is die residue from com grain harvesting, consisting of stalks, leaves, cobs, and husk.
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hay when fed to cattle. As a first approximatioii then, the stover supply curve facing ethanol processors in a
region is a step function (see figure 3). Initially, it is horizontal at net harvest cost; processing plants in well-
chosen locationsin cash-gr^ areas couldacquirestalksthat arenot used by livestock producers at slightly above
harvestcost Thesecond stq) of thesi5)ply function is definedby the higher value that livestock's producers are
willingto p^whenusingstoveras a feed. All availablestalk supplieswould be diverted to industrialuses if the
processOTs arewilling top^ sHghtlymorethanthe livestock value. The stalk siqsply is vertical at the pointwhere
all availablesi^plies areused by industry, provided that the amount of land that is plantedto com is given.
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A. Cost estimates
Thus, the DOE cost study is now adaptedto a corn-stalk-based process. The analysis require several
phases; the Midwest supply of com residue; processing yield and material flow adjustments that affect the
processing costs; andthepotential roleof transport costs as a limiting factor on the location of a large plant.
Each of these factors is considered below.
The net harvest cost estimates for comstaIks(table 1) include harvest expenses and fertilizer replacemoit
costs. Harvesting costs are approximated by machinery replacement and operating costs for harvesting hay.
Machmeiy and opCTatmg costs are converted to tons using a stalk yield estimate fi"om agronomic data; soacost
a(^ustment associated with the fact that stalk yield issomewhat less than hay yield is taken into account. Also,
the stover yield does allow for an amount left on the field for conservation compliance. Further, the fertilizer cost
estimate is based on replacement ofthe phosphorous and potassiimi (Claar etal.). Using hay harvest costs.
$
fertilizer replacement, 30 percent residue left on the field for conservation compliance gives astalks net harvest
costofS16.5/ton.
The transportation component ofmaterial costs increases with capacity because greater distances are
traveled to secure supplies.' Atransport cost adjustment increases the delivered input cost to S19.8/ton.
Similarly, the feed value ofhay can be calculated using seme adjustments for total digestible nutrients and
protein deficiencies ofcomstover in compariscn to hay (Stroben and Ajtss). Stover's value as a feed can be
calculated from die 1994 hay price at about S35/ton.
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The DOE "study is the reference point for cost estimates on cornstalk processing. However, several
adjustments wererequired. Inparticular, the lignin content of com stover is only one-halfof that for woodchips,
so theone-halfofelectrical plantcapacitythatwas soldas a byproductcredit is removed. Also, the 10%gasoline
mixingoperationwaseliminated so that estimates nowreferto a pure ethanol basis. Regarding financial matters,
the capitalallowance was calculated at a 10%returnanda 15-year amortization period. Also,inputprice and
coital costswereupdatedto a 1993basis. Finally, cornstalk harvesting costs calculated are usedfor feedstock
costs.
Therevisedmaterial flows andcostestimates are shown intable 2. Thebottomlineis an overall production
costfor ethanol of $.46/gal. Ethanol production at this cost would becompetitive with gasoline, evenwthout
subsidies.
Engineering estimates ofcost rely onmaterial flows and theequipment requirement for a small plant. Then
the0.6 factor rule provides anestimate for the capital cost of a large plant (Johnson, 1961). Sometimes viewed
asoverly c^tunistic, these estimates indicate the technology's potential after producers benefit from the learning
cu^e. For example, Leiberman argues that costs in the chemical processing industries fall in relation to flie
cumulative level ofou^ut and provides SOTie evidence fix)m ibs sector's e:<q)ansion phase. Specifically, unit costs
fell 80 percent when cumulative output doubled in the fifties and sixties. Similar experiences are likely in the
e:iq3ansion ofbioprocessing industries as well.
B. Supply Estimate
The volume ofcomstalks that would be available to the processing industry can be approximated by using
estimates ofavailable comstover, cattle's population md forage requirements, and the availability ofha>' for
forage. Specifically, the total stover supply estimate is given by state at the LHS of table 3. Calculations (not
sho^\n) im-olvedmultipKing astate's com area by astalk \-ieJd estimate that leaves an allowance for compliance
wth the conserv ation reserveprogram. SimilarK;. the cattle feed demand estimates in column two are the product
ofcattle s populations and forage requirements per animal, less hay supply for each state. In turn, the industry*
suppK- ofcolumn three is the suppij- less feed demand - about 125 bill lbs. would be available at low prices near •
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harvest cost Atprices above thefeedprice, theentirestoversupplyof about200 bill lbs.wouldbe available to
Uie processing industry.
It is likely that fuel processing could bid stalks awi^^ from livestockuse. Deriveddemand calculations are
based on the difference betweenthewholesale gasolinepriceandethanol processing costs, adjusted by processing
yield for an expression in input units. Somecalculations based on 1994market conditions suggest that stover
has a value in fuel production of$/40.8/ton.^ Thus. The fuel value exceeds the livestock's value.
Accordingly, theMidwest supplyofcomstoverwouldbe used for energyproduction. From table 3, about
12.24 billgallons of fiiel, >^ch is about 11%ofdomestic supply, wouldbe suppliedby the newethanol process.
This estimate may be on the conservative side; because the included states account for only 75% of com
production; because area planted and stalk output can respond to increasedprofitability; and because wood
residues have not been included.
Petroleum Market Simulations
The effect ofthe new edianol supply on the U.S. petroleummarket is estimated using the simulation model
with quantitative estimates of response andcost flmctions.
Results from recent studies ofthe U.S. petroleummarket provide estimates ofdemand, cost and siq)ply of
petroleum. For instance, Yucell provides estimates ofcost functions for OPEC and the United States, which are
used for marginal revenue and producer smplus calculations. Jones provides some estimates ofU.S. petroleum
market demand-the price elasticity is -.17 for the long run and -.07 for the short run. Finally, a rational
expectation stut^ of U.S. petroleum supply includes the ten-year response of drilling and new reserve
development; the long-run response to asustained price increase is described by asupply elasticity of0.15
(Walls). The conesponding (me j-ear response is .04. Esiimaies for supply and demand point to ahighly inelastic
structure in the petroleum market, e\"en inthe long-nm.
Next, apprcximaticais fa* market relationships are developed by calculating linear functions and normalizing
onacuial 1992 data. Simulations were based on long-run elasticities. But embargo-effect estimates are based
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on short-iun elasticities because ofthe limited adjustments that are possible during aone-year trade disruption.
The OPEC import response function isestimated using observed costs, imports and pricing behavior for the
1992 baseline. Inverting the mqwrt response fimcticm gives the implied estimate ofthe market power coefficient:
X= [ (a^-a^+c^) - {b^+bj CJ/Q. -1
The estimated value firom 1992 data is0.866, suggesting less than full monopoly pricing.
Thewelfare changes diatcorrespond tothemarket leallocations are alsoincluded in thesimulation exercise.
Welfare estimates are based on surplus measures and income indicators. Consumer surplus approximates
willingness to pay (Willig). The excess ofreturns over variable costs measures producerwelf^e (Just,et al).
The exogenous supply increase is the petroleum equivalent ofthe ethanol that is produced from cornstalks.
In lieu ofan extensive model offactor-product relationships and demand for products, the direct substitution
assumption is agood approximation. Ethanol is blended with gasoline for octane improvement anH otherwise
used for producing the dominant plastic feedstock (ethylene). The 242.4 mill bbl ofnew supply is the petroleum-
equivalent energ}' ofthe ethanol supply^. On balance, the estimate ofnew supplies is probably conservative,
because substitution for chemical inputs would likely occur on apound-for-pound basis.
Changes in the petroleummarket supply, import and price that are associated with the technology change
are given in table 4. The supply expansion causes amarket reallocation; domestic price falls in response to the
new supply. The price reduction of 6.7% is slightly larger than the corresponding supply increase. Also,
domestic demand increases and imports fall.
Welfare changes in the petroleum sector reflect the price change. There are losses for producers and gains
for consumers. For the U.S., the consumers' gain exceeds the producers' loss; there is a$2.0 bill gain for
participants in the U.S. petroleummarket OPEC producers lose about $3.0 bUl and fringe suppUers loose about
$0.9 bill.
But the United State's benefits e.Mend be>-ond the petroleum market benefits. Benefits to com producers
that are associated with the new technology- are measured in the input market. In general, the benefit to com
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producers is the vertical differoice between the derived demand and die supply curve for comstover. As a first
^proximation, thisbenefit isgiven bytheareaU+Lin figure 3,where the deriveddemand curveis approximated
by thedifference between thepost-change gasoline price and ethanol processing costs, which areexpressed in
input (cornstalk) umts. Similarly, the steps inthe supply function are defined byharvest costs and annual feed
values. The estimated benefits to comproducers areabout $1.4bil."*
Next, consider estimates of security benefits for theU.S. There aretwosources of loss associated with the
embargo. First, the reduction ofthe trade surplus loss is calculated fi'om estimated supply and HemanH fimctions.
The trade surplus in&e initialstate is calculated as thearea behind the excess demand curve andbetween the
initial pricein thetrade statePg and theautarl^price P.
TS^=!l'ED{P) dP=J (a^-a^) - (P^+3^) dP
Equations 1to 5define the price equilibrium in the trade-state. The Autailw price is defined by supply and
demand in the absence of trade
^a= y) /
The trade surplus in the final state is calculated with alower trade price and alower autarlq'^ price that inchidg
new supplies fi'om the technologj' change. Then the difference between final and initial trade surplus is the
reduction in welfare loss associated with the technology change. The loss to the U.S. economy, in terms of
reduced oil trade surplus, would be an $8.0 bill, in the e\'ent that the new technoiogj' is available during aone
year, total embargo.
Second, there is amacroeconomic effect of increasing oil prices and rising unemplovmcnt of labor. An
elasticiiy of emplo>inent with respect to the oil price, obtained fi-om Broadman and Bmce, is used to calculate
^ e iScnnolcgv change. The loss to the U.S. econom>'.
in terms of lost manufacmHng wages, could be reduced by S7.88 bil. in the e>-em that the ne^v technology is
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available during a one year embargo.
Next, evaluate the odds and the expectedvalue ofreducingembargo-relatedlosses. Therehave beenthree
disn^tiveevents in the last twodecades: Saudi Arabia in 1973, Iranin 1990, andIraq-Kuwait in 1990. Sothe
probability of a di5nq)tic»i is about .15. Hencethe e?q)ected valueof the technology relatedgains in theevent
of an embargo is thesumof trade and employment gains times the disruption probability, about $2.38 bill.
Further, total embargos have typically not been imposed on the U.S. petroleummaricet; the average fraction that
trade has been reduced during actual embargoes isabout .2. When the expected value ismultiplied by the export
reduction fraction, the expected loss estimate is about $.48 bill. The expected loss is the option value ofthe
ethanol siqipfy increase itgives the expected value ofthe loss that will be avoided with the technology investment.
This option iswortii about $2.4 for a total embargo and about $ 0.5 bill for apartial embargo.
The overall e?q)ectedwelfare gain to the united States is the probability-weighted average ofstate-dependent
net welfare gains (table 5). When agricultural producers' benefits are included with petroleum consumers and
producers in&e trade state, tibe net benefit to the U.S. in the trade state is a$3.4 bill. And the probability ofthe
trade state is 0.85, so the expected gain from the trade state is a$2.9 bill. The overall expected gain to the U.
S. both states is about $5.27 for atotal embargo and $3.4 bill and for apartial embargo. In either event the
option value related to embargo protection comprises asignificant proportion ofthe overall welfare gain
Summary and Conclusions
This study has examined the potential effect ofsome new technology on the petroleum market. This
technology should enable efGcient ethanol production from cellulose materials like woodchips and cornstalks.
Engineering cost data suggest that comstalk-based production can be competitive with some major petroleum
products. Further, available supplies are enough to make adifference in the petroleum market. Improvements
in the terms of trade result in gains to petroleum consumers and agricultural processors, while losses accrue to
established petroleum producers. Further, there is anet increase iii U.S. welfare. The supply expansion is
moderate. Howe^-er, phce effects stiJl make adiff^nce because the U.S. petroleummarket has aprice-inelastic
structure.
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Thebenefits ofa domestic supply increase differfirom thosethat would occurundercompetition andcertain
fieetrade. First, the supplyoffsets oligopoly pricing, reducing pricesand increasing consumer benefits. Also,
there is a moderate optionvaluefor reducing losses in the event ofan embargo. The estimates here suggest that
overall benefits to the U.S. will be imderestimated by 15 percent if the costs ofpartial embargos are excluded
fi"om the benefit-cost analysis. When the benefits of mitigating oHgopoly structure and uncertain trade are
combined with producer benefits fi'om the ne\v technology, the domestic supply increase looks like a good
investment, fi'om the viewpoint of the public sector and the private sector.
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Footnotes
1. The phj'-sical relationbetweendistance from theplant (r) andavailable supplies can be approximated by
Q=iur^)dy
which is theproduct of the areaof a circle of radius r, icr^, andthedensity of comstalk, cfy. In turn, stalk
density is the product ofyield and thedensity ofplanted comar^. When Qis set at thecapacity of the
processing plant, themaximumdistance from the plant can be obtainedby rearranging
r' = Jq/ (ndy) .
For example, the average comdensity and net stalk yield for Iowa are 187.62 acre/mi^ and y = 2
ton/acre. Further, fteannualinputrequiresnent forourhypothetical plantis Q= 2.903 miltons. Hence, the
largeplantmustuse all available comstoverwithin a49.6mileradius of theplant.
Todetermine the cost-distance relationship, notice that the production obtained from a ring ofa given
distance fromtheplant is givenby the productof circumference of the circle,
thewidthof theringandthedensity of cornstalks is aQ= (27cr)(dy)Ar.
Then themarginal cost ofexpanding the outer circle by the increment ai isgiven by C'(r) =P(r)(2TO)(^)Ar.
P(r) isthe price gradient frmction describing the price-distance surface—in awell chosen location, the price
gradient shouldbethe sum ofstalk harvest and transport costs. With a linear price gradient, the total cost
fimction
•)
cir)=f^'p{r) (2nr) (dy)dr
J 0
becomes rC(r) ={dy) C2n) j (P^+tr) rdr= (dy)
So the average input cost (AIC)is
C(r')^^ ^ 2tr
P +—r
° 3
O(r') ° 3
Recent quotations from Iowa trucking firms indicate that the
transportation rate is between $. l/ton/mile and $.15/ton/niile for short distances. Next, set Po=$16.5/ton
from stalk har\'est cost. Then the average cost ofall stover drawn from within 49.6 miles'" is between
$19,8/ton and $21.5/ton. The lower stover cost estimate is used in the processing cost stu^because the
routine of a large plant would reduce the short-haul rate
The difference between the wholesale gasoline price and ethanol processing costs for 1994, converted to
cornstalk equivalents is shown below
. $.591 _$.252 , .3575 It ezh 2000 lb cal
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3. It is calculatedon the basis of relative energycontent, about 66% for elhanol (Wijetillekeand Ody). But
a 25% adjustment for the contributionof ethanolblends to combustion in gasoline is also included
(Schrader and Tyner). The physical conversion is 1bbl oil = .833 bbl ethanol.
4. Given estimates in this report the welfare area in figure 2 is
U+L= ^ t37.18-16.5) ]_25.9i3ii lb
ton 2000 lb
$37.18-35 (203.5-125.91)iji-2 lb —
ton 20001b
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1. Costs ofcom stalk harvest, 1993 data
Operation Fixed cost
Reported per ton
Rake^ $2.43/acre $1.215/ton
Baler^ $3.14/bale $6.28/ton
Directharvesting costs
Total direct cost:
a.assume 2 ton/acre
b.assume 2 bales/ton
$7.495/ton
Variable Cost
Reported per ton
$1.52/acre $0.76/ton
$2,05/baIe $4.10/ton
$4.86/ton
Application
rate
P2O3 13 lb/acre
kjO 71 lb/acre
Total indirect cost:
Indirectfertilizer replacement costs
Price
$150/ton
$206/ton
Total direct and indirect cost:
Sources: Duffy^d Judd
Claar et al.
$0.075/lb
$0.103/lb
Total($/ton)
$12.355/ton
$0.488/ton
$3.657/ton
$4.144/ton
$16.50/ton
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Table 2. Productioncost estimate for com stover to ethanol plant
Units per gallon
Wood/stover, st
Sulfuric acid, lb
Lime, lb
Ammonia, lb
Nutrients, lb
Com liquor, lb
Com oil, lb
Glucose, lb
Catalyst
Disposal, ton
Water, mgal
Labor, man >ts
Foremen, man \ts
Si^er^isors, man yrs
0.0083
0.297
0.219
0.4704
0.0181
0.0633
0.0039
0.037
1
-0.00034
0.01987
materials
41
9
1
materials + labor
Capital(10%return, 15 jt
amortization)
Total production cost
Total processing cost (net of stover)
Ethanol output
Input required:
Plant cost:
349.72 mil gal
2.903 mil ton
$562.36 mil
1993 price Unit expense $/gal
19.805
86.2 $/ton
40 $/ton
200 $/ton
0.115 $/Ib
0.133 $/Ib
0.2067 $/lb
0.129 $/lb
O.OI $/unit
20 $/ton
0.002 $/gal
0.247924
29800 $/>T
34000 $/\T
40000 $/yr
0.252407
0.211426
0.463834
0.299449
0.164384
0.012801
0.00438
0.04704
0.002082
0.008419
0.000806
0.004773
0.01
-0,0068
0.00004
0.003494
0.000875
0.000114
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Table 3. Com'Stover: net supply available for industrial processing, 1993 data
State Stover supply, bill lb Stover feed demand, bill lb Low-cost supply
IL 42.91 4.34 38.57
IN 22.00 2.71 19.29
lA 48,00 16.63 31.37
KS 8.26 22.55 -14.29
KY 5.66 5.16 0.49
MN 16.15 3.18 12.97
MO 7.65 12.08 -4.43
NE 27.82 17.92 9.90
OH 13.39 0.07 13.32
SI> 4.21 7.98 -3.77
WI 7.24 11.01 -3.78
Total supply, bill lb. 203.25 125.91
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Table 4. The effect ofnew supply on the petroleum market
Variable Units 1992 baseline Increased supply Difference
Markets effects:
Demand, oil equivalent
U.S.+fringe oil supply
New supply
Imports from OPEC
Swptos:
U.S. consumers
U.S. suppliers
Net U.S. gain
OPEC siq)pliers
Fringe si^pliers
milbbl
mil bbl
milbbl
mil bbl
$/bbl
mil $
mil $
mil $
mil $
6271
4870.0
0
1401
18.47
342683
52289
17447
8924.4
6337.4
4824.3
242.4
1271
17.31
349973
47033
14357
8027
+66.4
-45.7
242.4
-130
-1.16
7290
-5256
2034
-3090
-897
Table 5. Summary of the U.S. Welfare ChangesAssociated with a Supply Increase: State-
Dependent and Expected Values
Welfare Changes
Trade Embargo
State State Total
Net U.S. Gain in the Petroleum Market 2.0
Gain to Com Producers 1.4
Reduction in Trade Surplus Loss 8.08
Unemployment Reduction 7.88
Total 3.4 15.96
Probability .85 .15
Contribution to ExpectedWelfare Change 2.89 2.38 (.48") 5.27(3.37')
Calculated assuming that the embargo fraction, 0.2, ismultiplied bythe expected welfare change inthe
embargo state.
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